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Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of direct payments and rural development 
measures of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on employment in agriculture. We 
work with a dynamic labour demand equation augmented by the full set of policy instruments 
of the CAP, which is estimated on a panel dataset of 69 East German regions. We present re-
sults for four estimators which differ in how they eliminate the fixed effects and how they ad-
dress the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. The results suggest that there were 
few desirable effects on job maintenance in agriculture. While there is some indication that 
investment subsidies have halted labour shedding on farms, a rise in the general wage level 
reduced labour use in agriculture. Changes in direct payments had no employment effects. 
Generally, labour adjustment exhibits a strong path dependency.
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Common Agricultural Policy; East Germany.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Auswirkungen der im Rahmen der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik
(GAP) gewährten Direktzahlungen und der Maßnahmen zur ländlichen Entwicklung auf die 
Beschäftigung im Agrarsektor zu untersuchen. Wir verwenden hierfür eine dynamische Arbeits-
nachfragegleichung, welche um das vollständige Maßnahmenbündel der GAP erweitert wurde.
Diese Gleichung wird für einen Paneldatensatz aus 69 ostdeutschen Landkreisen geschätzt. 
Wir stellen Ergebnisse für vier verschiedene Schätzer vor, die sich darin unter-scheiden, wie 
sie fixe Effekte und die Endogenität der verzögert abhängigen Variable kontrollieren. Die Ergeb-
nisse legen nahe, dass es wenige wünschenswerte Effekte auf die Beschäftigungssicherung in 
der Landwirtschaft gegeben hat. Einige Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass Investitionsbeihilfen 
den Arbeitskräfteabbau verlangsamt haben. Ein Anstieg des allgemeinen Lohnniveaus hat den 
Arbeitseinsatz in der Landwirtschaft verringert. Änderungen in den Direktzahlungen hatten 
keinen Beschäftigungseffekt. Grundsätzlich zeigt die Anpassung des Arbeitseinsatzes eine 
starke Pfadabhängigkeit.
Schlüsselwörter: Landwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung; Dynamisches Paneldaten Modell; 
Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik; Ostdeutschland.
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1 Introduction
Agricultural employment poses a dilemma for policy makers in Europe. On the one hand, 
agriculture’s share in employment of all West European economies has been constantly 
declining for decades (Tracy 1993). On the other hand, many citizens expect that safeguarding 
jobs should be the top priority of government. Following this logic, politicians and farm 
lobbyists regularly claim that a protective agricultural policy is indispensable for keeping jobs 
in the sector. Furthermore, it is argued that agriculture has much potential to also provide 
environmental services, contribute to quality of life in rural areas, and supply raw material for 
energy production. The “second pillar” instruments of the European Union’s (EU) Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), such as investment aid, agri-environmental payments, and a broad 
range of rural development measures, are supposed to create employment via these additional 
functions (see, e.g., EC 2006). It is thus a question of high political relevance whether these 
policy measures can indeed halt or even reverse the persistent decline of agricultural 
employment. 
The contribution of this article is to econometrically analyse the effects of the full CAP port-
folio in the framework of a dynamic labour adjustment model. The model is applied to East 
German county (Landkreis) data. Our methodological inspiration is taken from the econo-
metric evaluation literature using panel data to address problems of unobserved heterogeneity 
and selectivity in programme participation (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009; Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009). Such approaches have only recently been taken up in the field of agri-
cultural policy analysis. Patton et al. (2008) as well as Kirwan (2009) used regression methods
to analyse the effects of farm programs on land rental values, based on panel data. Pufahl and 
Weiss (2009) applied semi-parametric propensity score matching to evaluate the effects of the 
German agri-environmental programme on production decisions. Petrick and Zier (2011) used 
a difference-in-differences estimator to analyse the effects of various CAP measures on labour 
use in East German agriculture. While these studies shed light on interesting empirical patterns
of policy treatments and economic outcomes in agriculture, their theoretical foundation tends 
to be weak. Their methodological choices imply that there is typically no linkage to the 
underlying structural models of economic behaviour (Heckman 2010). 
The subsequent policy analysis aims to be both informed by theory and aware of the methodo-
logical issues important in quantitative impact evaluation. We motivate the dynamic structure 
of our empirical model theoretically and use fixed effects and instrumental variable regression 
techniques to address problems of latent heterogeneity and endogeneity. Given this specifica-
tion, a key question is how consistent estimates of the adjustment coefficient can be obtained. 
We present several results that build on recent insights from the dynamic panel modelling 
literature. Our article is the first to utilise these methods for an analysis of dynamic factor adjust-
ment in agriculture. While the dynamic structure is strongly supported by the empirical evidence,
policy impacts on employment appear to be quite modest. As discussed in the conclusions 
section, the current set of agricultural policy instruments hardly serves the public goal of job 
maintenance in agriculture.
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2 Labour adjustment and the Common Agricultural Policy in 
East Germany
In 1989, collectivised agriculture in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) entered 
the transition process with a share of eight per cent in domestic value added and ten per cent 
in domestic employment (BMELF 1991). Eight years after the beginning of reforms, labour 
use had gone down by 76 per cent of the 1989 level (Figure 1), the strongest decline among 
all European transition countries. However, wages paid to agricultural workers unambiguously
grew. Value added per labour unit increased almost six-fold between 1989 and 1995. At this 
time, it approached the level of the old Länder, which it outperformed regularly after 2000. 
Due to special government programmes and immediate CAP implementation, farms had more 
rapid and easy access to capital than other Central European transition countries. On the other 
hand, rising capital stocks, labour-saving technologies, the terms-of-trade shock due to 
unification, and a generous social safety net implying increasing reservation wages explain 
why labour cuts in agriculture were higher than anywhere else in the region (Forstner and 
Isermeyer 2000; Koester and Brooks 1997).
Figure 1: Labour use and labour productivity in German agriculture, 1988-2006
Notes: Labour use: Values for 1990 and 1993 are linear interpolations. East German data before 1990 
represents stocks on September 30, all other figures are annual averages. 
Value added: Labour costs not included. 4.4 DDR Mark are equivalent to 1 Deutsche Mark, following 
Jenkis (2005, 448). Missing data points are due to gaps in official statistics.
Sources:Authors’ calculations based on Statistical Yearbooks and Destatis (2009).
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Several indicators suggest that the transition process of East German agriculture had been 
accomplished by the mid 1990s. Labour productivity had reached the West German level. 
National structural policies in agriculture were made uniform in East and West after 1996. 
Legal and institutional structures were widely harmonised. However, twenty years after the 
fall of the Berlin wall, farm structures continue to differ widely between the old and new 
Länder. In the latter, land utilisation was and still is dominated by legal entities based on hired 
labour, often in the form of agricultural cooperatives. In 1998, the average farm size in the 
East was 175 ha compared to 24 ha in the West, and more than 50 per cent of East German agri-
cultural area were cultivated by farms bigger than 1000 ha (Forstner and Isermeyer 2000, 77). 
At the same time, rural unemployment rates of 25 per cent and more in conjunction with a 
significant outmigration of young persons pressed East German politicians to make safe-
guarding and creation of rural jobs their top priority. This priority was widely used as a 
justification for the continuing inflow of CAP transfers, which became the major political 
determinant of decision making in agriculture. As a result of the Agenda 2000 and the Mid-
term review reforms of the CAP, East German Länder have been spending about two thirds of 
their CAP budget on direct payments, of which 75 per cent are co-financed by the EU (see 
Petrick and Zier, 2011, on the three Länder studied in the following). In 2005, the Single 
Farm Payment (SFP) decoupled payments from the specific cropping pattern of a given farm 
and from the number of animals kept. It linked them only to a certain reference area of land in 
agricultural use. 
After 1999, structural and environmental measures were unified into the “rural development” 
regulation 1257/1999, which was implemented according to Objective 1 provisions in the new 
Länder. The emphasis was on instruments for the “development of rural areas” which 
included infrastructure investments, such as road construction and improvement. They were 
usually disbursed to local municipalities. Agri-environmental measures entailed payments for 
the maintenance of extensive grassland and the conversion to organic farming. About ten to 
twenty million euro were spent on compensatory allowances for less-favoured areas (LFA), as 
well as on investment aids and processing and marketing support. The former represented 
support for regions with unfavourable conditions for agriculture, while the latter two were 
credit subsidies for a wide range of capital investments on farms and in the downstream 
sector. After 2007, most of these measures were continued under the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development regulations.
3 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses
3.1 A model of dynamic labour adjustment
The planning horizon of the farmer is assumed to start at time zero and last infinitely. In each 
period t, the farm produces a single current output as described by a production function  .f
that has the current stock of labour, tL , as its only argument.  .f is assumed to be concave, 
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such that 0'',0' ! ff . With static expectations, prices for output, p, and labour, w, are 
assumed constant over time. The farmer adjusts his plans and his targets every year as prices 
and technology change. However, adjustment of the labour stock is costly, as described by a 
convex adjustment cost function  tLC  , with tL denoting the gross change of labour stock per 
period, and 0'',0' !! CC . Furthermore, 0'zC as 0zL , and   00  C . Given current prices, 
technology and potentially other exogenous factors such as the policy environment, farmers 
project a desired level of employment, *L , every period and adjust the current stock 
accordingly. However, as adjustment is subject to a convex cost schedule, it will be gradual 
over time, so that the equilibrium employment level is reached only asymptotically.
Formally, the decision problem of the agricultural firm faced at time zero is to maximise the 
present value, PV, of its earnings:
(1)    ^ `³f  
0
max dteLCwLLpfPV rttttLt
 ,
subject to 0L given, where r is a constant discount rate.
Using the calculus of variations to solve this problem, the first order condition for an optimal 
path of tL governed by (1) is given by the following Euler equation (Nickell 1986, 482):
(2)      tttt LCLLrCwLpf  ''''  .
This problem is typically studied by assuming quadratic adjustment costs   2LbLaLC   ,
with 0, !ba (Hamermesh 1993, 210). Equilibrium labour demand in the long-run steady 
state, *L , is characterised by 0  LL  , and, as an implication of the quadratic adjustment 
cost function, obeys the following condition:
(3)   rawLpf  *' .
This is the familiar first-order condition from a static profit maximisation problem, except that 
the labour cost include both the current wage and a discounted once for all marginal 
adjustment cost of hiring or releasing one additional worker. Hence, in the presence of 
adjustment costs, it pays the firm to reduce employment as long as the foregone output is 
compensated by the saved adjustment costs.
A convenient implication of the assumption of quadratic adjustment costs is that it establishes 
a direct link to the flexible accelerator or partial adjustment model, which has been a widely 
used basis for empirical work on quasi-fixed factor demand (Bond and Van Reenen 2007, 
4443).1 Under quadratic adjustment costs, eq. (2) yields a general solution to the Euler 
1 In agricultural applications, also labour adjustment models based on dynamic duality have been popular, see 
Vasavada and Chambers (1986), Chang and Stefanou (1988), Stefanou et al. (1992), Pietola and Myers 
(2000).
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equation in the form of a second-order linear differential equation which can be solved for its 
characteristic roots. As Chiang (1992, 110) shows, the characteristic roots yield a solution for 
the coefficient of adjustment, J , in the following partial adjustment model:
(4)  tt LLL  *J .
Given the above theoretical framework, this equation describes how the firm partially adjusts 
its labour stock to the steady state through time. The speed of adjustment is determined by 
10 dd J and is decreasing in the level of adjustment costs (Nickell 1986, 504).
3.2 The cost of adjustment
Adjustment costs are largely determined by the specific organisational and institutional 
structure of the sector under study and are thus an empirical matter. Because employment 
protection legislation is relatively strict in Germany (OECD 2004), there will be significant 
firing costs due to government regulation. Moreover, in agricultural cooperatives, dismissing 
workers may have the consequence that these workers withdraw their share in the cooperative 
and hence reduce equity. Dismissed workers who are also land owners may no longer be 
willing to rent their plot to the large farm. These types of costs increase linearly with the 
number of fired workers. However, considering that typical farms in the region employ about 
30 workers, releasing more than one or two workers per year may lead to significant internal 
disruption and reorganisation costs that increase at the margin. Other important firing costs 
will be of a social nature, in the sense that farm managers fear a negative reputation in the 
local public if they fire too many at a time (Wolz et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, there is now widespread evidence that it is increasingly difficult to find 
trained and motivated workers in cases where they are to be hired. Recent years have seen 
significantly decreasing numbers of students leaving secondary schools in East Germany, thus 
threatening the availability of trainees for “green” jobs (Agra Europe 2010). As shown by 
Uhlig (2008), unemployment levels in the age class below 25 years have recently not been 
higher in the East German states than elsewhere in Germany. For this reason also hiring costs 
can be assumed to be substantial and marginally increasing.
We thus maintain the standard assumption of a convex cost schedule in the following. With 
regard to the empirical application, this has the advantage of motivating a simple specification 
of the partial adjustment model.
3.3 Hypotheses about CAP effects on labour use
In order to analyse policy effects on long-term labour demand given our theoretical model, it 
is crucial to identify how changes in exogenous conditions affect *L . The standard model 
implies that higher output prices and less productive technology tend to increase optimal 
labour use, while higher wages reduce it. In addition, the following hypotheses about the 
impact of measures can be generated: 
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1. Direct payments coupled to certain production activities, such as field crops or livestock 
rearing, will induce additional employment if more workers are required to maintain these 
activities. However, as payments were no longer coupled to the level of output already in 
the beginning of the period observed here, allocation effects will be small. Direct payments 
and compensations for LFA will have no effect on labour use if they are fully decoupled.2
A shift from a coupled to a decoupled policy regime, as implied by the CAP reform 
implemented in 2005, will therefore tend to release workers.
2. Most of the public goods investments, both for “rural development” or “processing and 
marketing”, can be assumed to generate higher output prices (for example by reducing 
transaction or transport cost) and thus tend to increase labour use. Some may also reduce 
adjustment costs by making it easier to hire or release labour. For example, search costs 
may be lower with better infrastructure. In general, many effects of public goods 
investment on factor and output prices will be indirect. Note that the reduced form model 
estimated below measures these net effects, accounting for all direct and indirect effects at 
the regional level. 
3. Capital subsidies will reduce labour demand if labour and capital are technological 
substitutes, but will induce it if they are complements. 
4. Agri-environmental payments are linked to certain types of output which generate positive 
environmental externalities (for example, protection of biodiversity or a certain landscape, 
or reduced soil erosion). They hence make the production of these outputs economically 
more attractive. If these outputs are produced by using a more labour-intensive technology 
than conventional outputs, they will increase labour demand. 
It is hence not unfounded to expect that agricultural policies may have positive effects on 
agricultural employment, although effects of different policy packages may be of opposite 
direction. What the effects are in reality is an empirical question that is addressed next.
4 Empirical strategy and data
We now derive an estimable equation of dynamic labour demand and discuss a number of 
challenges that arise in its empirical implementation.
4.1 Deriving an estimating equation
A standard approach in the labour economics literature has been to replace the unobserved 
*L in (4) by a function  XG in order to obtain an estimable model, where X is a vector of 
determining variables (Hamermesh 1993, chapter 7). Such reduced-form approaches typically 
2 It has been argued that they may increase factor use via wealth and insurance effects (Hennessy 1998). 
Sckokai and Moro (2009) have shown recently for Italy that the risk-related effect of direct payments is 
small.
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use output, factor stocks and/or prices as exogenous variables (Bond and Van Reenen 2007, 
4478). We hypothesise that the various policy measures do have an impact on long-term 
labour demand. Furthermore, as the impact on agricultural employment may vary 
substantially among policy measures and may even be of opposite sign, we argue that it is 
necessary to analyse their influence simultaneously. Several of the policy measures are not 
directly paid to agricultural firms, in particular, processing and marketing as well as rural 
development funds. However, annual payment streams disaggregated by measures are 
available from Petrick and Zier (2011) at the county level. We therefore conduct the analysis 
at this level and assume that the theoretical model applies to a regionally representative farm. 
As we linearise the model below, it can be regarded as a consistent aggregation of individual 
farms. We postulate that optimal employment is determined by the following set of factors:
(5)  jjtjtjtjt ZZpGL ,~,,* T ,
where *jtL is the projected long-term agricultural employment in region j at time t, jtT is a 
vector of policy expenses that vary across regions and periods, jtp is a vector of regionalised
input and output prices at time t, jtZ
~ is a vector of regional characteristics that also vary 
across time and space, and jZ a vector of time-invariant regional characteristics, including 
land endowments.
can be formulated in discrete time as follows:
(6)  11 *    tttt LLLL J .
Solving (6) for tL and inserting yields an estimable reduced-form equation of tL .
Linearising this equation gives the following expression:
(7) jtjjtjtjtjtjt ZZpLL HEEETEO   43211 ~ ,
where O and iE are parameter vectors to be estimated and jtH is an identically and inde-
pendently distributed error term. Note that this partial adjustment model provides an estimate 
of the coefficient of adjustment, as OJ  1 . Concerning the effects of policy measures on 
labour demand, short-run and long-run effects have to be distinguished. Policies may affect 
current labour demand immediately, as measured by 1E . However, there is also a long-term 
effect via the dynamic adjustment process. In the steady state, 1 jtjt LL . Substituting this 
into and solving for jtL leads to the long-run effect of jtT , which is   J
E
O
E 11
1
  . The 
smaller J , the slower is the adjustment of y to a new equilibrium and the bigger the effect of 
jtT that can only be observed in the long-run. If 1 J (or 0 O ), adjustment to the steady 
state is immediate and there is no sluggish adjustment at all. In this case, there is no effect that 
only occurs in the long-run. The model is transformed into a static model.
8 Martin Petrick and Patrick Zier
SiAg-Working Paper 12 (2012); HU Berlin
In the following, we wish to estimate in order to identify effects of the elements of jtT on 
jtL . This is subject to two major methodological challenges. The first is the role of unobserved
time-varying variables that may have an effect on regional policy expenses, as discussed in 
the literature on empirical incidence analysis that exploits variations in policies (Besley and 
Case, 2000; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The second is the endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable, as discussed in the literature on dynamic panel data models (Arellano and 
Bond 1991; Kiviet 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998).
4.2 Endogeneity of policy variables
Simply regressing observed employment figures on a set of regional characteristics and policy 
expenses will lead to biased estimates if not all relevant control variables can be observed 
provided the control variables not included in the regression are correlated with the variables 
of interest. While some of these control variables are routinely published by statistical agencies,
such as land resources or climatic conditions, others are unlikely to be easily recorded, such as 
regional human or social capital. Researchers relying only on observable variables make the 
assumption of ‘unconfoundedness’ or ‘selection on observables’ (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
They will generate spurious policy effects if they disregard relevant unobserved variables. 
However, if the effects of time-invariant characteristics can be linearly separated, regional 
fixed-effects will eliminate the bias originating from observed and unobserved heterogeneity, 
thus allowing for ‘selection on unobservables’. Forming first differences of leads to:
(8)     11211    jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt xxLLLL HHEO ,
where jtx is the vector of time-varying right-hand variables in . This equation shows that the 
influence of observed and latent characteristics of regions, as far as they are time invariant, as 
well as any other linear separable selection bias is ‘swept out’ of the equation. Because 1jtL
is correlated with 1jtH from , 21   jtjt LL will be correlated with 1 jtjt HH in (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005, 765). This latter problem will be addressed in the next section.
Besley and Case (2000) argue that regional political variables may have an effect on regional 
policy design. Whereas the procedures for calculating and administrating direct payments 
under the CAP are mostly settled at the European and national level, states have freedom to 
allocate funds on investment support, rural development and agri-environment. However, 
there is practically no decision power related to the CAP at the county level, our unit of 
observation.
With regard to direct payments, critical variables in determining payment streams are which 
crops are planted and how many animals are kept in a given region, particularly cattle. Similarly,
the area under environmentally friendly practices or the farms’ investment activities are deter-
mining the absorption of agri-environmental measures or capital subsidies. While these are 
decision variables of the farm managers and thus potentially endogenous, we maintain the 
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assumption that there is an average potential of a region to absorb these payments. This 
potential is assumed to be completely determined by the given environmental conditions and
human resources of that region. It can thus be eliminated by fixed effects. Changes in this 
potential over time are neglected. Transfers that are not paid on the basis of voluntary partici-
pation of farmers, such as public good investments or measures affecting the downstream 
sector are exogenous to the model per se.
4.3 Endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable
Estimating dynamic panel data models has recently been an active field of research and there 
is no single established estimator. The traditionally employed least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) approach to eliminate fixed effects is to time demean the sample, which means either 
differencing out group means or using group dummy variables. In dynamic models like this 
approach will be inconsistent if T is small, because 1jtL is endogenous (Nickell 1981). 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested to eliminate fixed effects by first differencing and use 
2jtL in an equation like to instrument 21   jtjt LL , as 2jtL is uncorrelated with 1 jtjt HH .
This approach yields consistent estimates if foN .3 Arellano and Bond (1991) improved 
the efficiency of the instrumental variables approach by using additional lags of the lagged 
dependent variable in the framework of a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. 
The ensuing discussion in the literature showed that the true persistence of the dependent 
variable and the number of T available in the dataset have a decisive influence on the bias and 
efficiency of the estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that the Arellano-Bond 
estimator may perform poorly if the true autoregressive parameter is high (that is, values of 
0.8 and above). Their alternative estimator, hereafter called BB, displayed notable efficiency 
gains if lagged differences were included as instruments into a level equation of the dependent 
variable. Previous studies indicate that labour adjustment in agriculture tends to be slow, so 
that the preferred estimator should be robust to high autoregressive parameters. 
Unfortunately, the instrument proliferation in BB does not come without a cost. As high-
lighted by Roodman (2009a), it may bias the coefficient estimates of endogenous variables 
due to overfitting, weaken test procedures of instrument validity, and produce downward-
biased standard errors. The latter was addressed by a variance correction for the two-step BB 
estimator due to Windmeijer (2005), which we also use in the following. Furthermore, Roodman
(2009a) recommends testing results for sensitivity to reductions in instrument numbers.
Another concern is that the instrumental variables estimators are valid for large N, but their 
properties in small sample sizes are generally unknown. Analysts working with macro panels 
containing only a limited number of cross-sectional units have therefore questioned their 
usefulness for empirical work (Judson and Owen, 1999). Assuming strict exogeneity of the 
3 Consistency is achieved by the use of instruments, not by first differencing. There is no a-priori reason that 
makes time demeaning the preferred method of eliminating fixed effects vis-à-vis first differencing, and 
simulation results are inconclusive (Kiviet 1995). 
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right-hand variables other than 1jtL , Kiviet (1995) made the case that the advantages of the 
LSDV approach in terms of efficiency could be combined with the consistency of the GMM 
estimators by using the latter for a correction of the former. Monte Carlo studies of small N
and moderate T (for example 20,100   TN ) by Judson and Owen (1999) used the correction
factor developed by Kiviet (1995) to estimate a “corrected LSDV” (LSDVC). They showed 
that it outperformed the GMM approaches both in terms of bias and efficiency. Bruno (2005a) 
extended the LSDV correction procedure for application in unbalanced panels. 
Flannery and Hankins (2010) were the first to also investigate how the choice of the estimator 
affects the estimates for the exogenous variables. In their simulation studies based on short 
panels of corporate finance data, BB and LSDVC ranked highest in accurately estimating the 
O -parameter. Even so, the results also made clear that reliability of the E -estimates can be a 
problem even for these estimators if panels are short, the true autoregressive parameters are 
high, and the exogenous variables are highly persistent themselves. Despite these limitations, 
BB and LSDVC are the preferred estimators. We present results on both estimators in the 
following.
4.4 Control variables
Further exogenous variables were included in to control potentially confounding factors of 
the farms’ external environment. Our focus was on input and output price data.
Wages and the local demographic structure are likely to vary both across time and space. 
Labour markets are typically local because of the inherent immobility of these factors. In 
addition, net migration out of rural areas may have led to local shortages of labour (Uhlig 
2008). It also may have wider implications in terms of public goods provision by the 
government. We therefore included variables on wages and regional population density in jtZ
~ .
The wage variable reflects the regional gross wage level in all sectors, including social benefits.4
Moreover, we included four different price indices that vary over time but not across regions, 
namely for agricultural plant and livestock products, for variable inputs, and for agricultural 
investment goods. These variables control time-related shocks and thus help to justify the 
assumption of independent error terms across counties.
Data on land prices was not available with sufficient coverage to be included in the model. 
We did not include factor stock variables other than labour. These were regarded as either 
exogenous and constant at the regional level, such as land, or are endogenous to a dynamic 
model, such as capital.
4 Unfortunately, wage data differentiated by sectors is not available at the regional level.
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4.5 Data
A key question posed by our research was which data aggregation level to use. In the present 
application, we work with regional CAP expenditure data described in Petrick and Zier 
(2011), which covers 69 counties ( 69 N ). In this dataset, information on CAP payments 
originates from paying agencies of the state agricultural ministries. Compared to farm-
individual data, for example originating from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), 
regional data has the obvious disadvantage of hiding farm-specific detail and structure due to 
aggregation. However, this particular regional dataset has a couple of advantages, too. First, it 
represents the complete account of CAP expenditure per region, not only the funds received 
by a sample of farms. Furthermore, all actual agricultural employees in a given region are 
recorded. Problems of biased sample selection inevitably arising from an FADN dataset are 
thus avoided. In addition, FADN datasets are often lacking sufficient coverage of key 
variables. For example, Shucksmith et al (2005, 66) could only use data for agri-environmental
payments and compensations for LFA from their EU-wide analysis of FADN data. Here we 
have all measures compiled from one consistent source, including those that are not directly 
paid to farmers, such as development of rural areas and processing and marketing.
Data for employment and the control variables except the agricultural price indices originates 
from Destatis (2009). Agricultural price indices were taken from BMELV. The data panel is 
slightly unbalanced. There is generally a coverage of 7 years in the right-hand variables, but 
the period covered differs by one year, depending on the state (Table 1). Furthermore, the 
number of lags available for the dependent variable varies between states.
Table 1: Overview of data coverage
Brandenburg 
(N=16)
Saxony 
(N=29)
Saxony-Anhalt 
(N=24)
Dependent variable 1994-2006 (T=13) 1996-2006 (T=11) 1994-2006 (T=13)
Right-hand variables 2000-2006 (T=7) 2000-2006 (T=7) 1999-2005 (T=7)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The dataset distinguishes eight different policy measures. From the “first pillar” these are: 
coupled area payments; coupled livestock payments; and decoupled direct payments, that is 
the SFP introduced in 2005. From the “second pillar”, the measures are: development of rural 
areas; processing and marketing support; investment aids to farm businesses; compensatory 
payments to LFA; payments within the agri-environmental programme. Their individual 
components are described in the appendix of Petrick and Zier (2011). In addition, a dummy 
variable “decoupling” was included that takes the value of one in 2005 and 2006 and zero 
otherwise, to capture reform effects not due to the volume of payments. Descriptive statistics 
of the variables are given in Table 2. All monetary variables are in real terms, using the GDP 
deflator for Germany and taking 2000 as a base year.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obser-vations
Employees in agriculture Persons 1913.10 1089.41 109 5337 815
Coupled area payments Million EUR 9.43 9.22 0.00 39.88 483
Coupled livestock payments Million EUR 1.12 1.60 0.00 10.52 483
Decoupled direct payments Million EUR 3.30 7.79 0.00 46.85 483
Development of rural areas Million EUR 3.91 3.24 0.00 22.30 483
Processing and marketing Million EUR 0.33 1.52 -0.74a 23.19 483
Investment aids Million EUR 0.67 0.72 0.00 4.05 483
LFA Million EUR 0.66 0.81 0.00 3.35 483
Agri-environment Million EUR 1.63 1.88 0.00 11.74 483
Population density Persons/km² 288.18 380.90 41.36 1912.12 483
Average annual wage all sectors Thousand EUR 24.62 1.40 21.21 29.15 483
Output price index plant 
production
2000=100 104.0 5.5 97.6 114.4 483
Output price index livestock 
production
2000=100 98.6 4.1 92.1 105.5 483
Input price index variable inputs 2000=100 104.0 4.5 93.2 110.3 483
Input price index agricultural 
investment goods
2000=100 102.7 2.7 98.7 107.8 483
Note: a Overpayment in some regions led to negative expenses in subsequent years. All monetary values 
expressed in real terms, using the GDP deflator for Germany.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Data sources see text.
5 Estimation results
In Table 3, we show results for four different fixed effects specifications of . We estimated 
the LSDV with a first order autoregressive lag as a naïve reference model along with two 
versions of the Blundell-Bond estimator. One BB version uses the full instrument set that is 
available in the data and one collapses the number of instruments to one per lag length, 
following the procedure outlined in Roodman (2009a). Furthermore, we present results for a 
corrected LSDV estimator due to Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005a), by using the results from 
fully instrumented BB for initialisation.5
The LSDV and BB models use cluster robust standard errors based on the county variable, 
which controls for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the LSDV model (Cameron
and Trivedi 2005, 707). The BB models report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors due 
to Windmeijer (2005) and robust tests for serial correlation due to Arellano and Bond (1991). 
5 Estimations were carried out by using the routines xtreg and xtdpdsys implemented in Stata 12, as well as the 
user-written routines xtabond2 due to Roodman (2009b) and xtlsdvc due to Bruno (2005b). The latter was 
modified to accomodate the xtdpdsys results for initialisation.
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The tests present no evidence of second-order autocorrelation. We also apply Hansen’s J-test 
for instrument validity in the BB models (Hansen 1982). The test gave no evidence of 
misspecification in both models. The LSDVC model uses bootstrapped standard errors. The 
hypothesis that estimated parameters are all zero was clearly rejected in the LSDV and BB 
models, as indicated by the F- DQGȤð-statistics. We followed Im et al. (2003) in testing for 
panel-specific unit roots in the employment variable under the assumption of fixed T, which 
seems appropriate given our short panel. Allowing for a time trend, the reported standardised 
test statistic ( -5.697~  bartZ ) allowed us to reject the hypothesis that the panels were all non-
stationary at the one per cent significance level.6
Our interest focuses on the evidence concerning lagged adjustment and the effects of policy 
measures. All models show that labour adjustment is sluggish, with a highly significant 
coefficient of adjustment. However, the reported levels differ. The LSDV result is notably 
lower than the other three, which is in accordance with the known downward bias of this 
estimator (Nickell 1981). The BB results are close to the LSDVC result, which adds strength 
to the evidence that the coefficient of adjustment is at about 20 per cent. As noted above, the 
use of methods robust to highly persistent data is thus warranted. The estimate means that, 
after a shock, it takes a bit more than three years to move halfway to the new steady state.7
Adjustment is thus similar to the rate reported in Chang and Stefanou (1988) for Pennsylvania 
dairy farms and a bit slower than found by Stefanou et al. (1992) for German family farms, 
but considerably faster than estimated by, e.g., Vasavada and Chambers (1986) for aggregate 
US data and Pietola and Myers (2000) for Finnish hog farmers.
With regard to policy effects, there is some evidence on positive employment effects of invest-
ment support, which is significant at five per cent in the LSDV and the full BB model. According
to the latter estimate, one million euro of investment aid per region creates about 20 jobs in 
agriculture in the short run. For this short run effect, approximately 50 thousand euro annually 
are required to create one additional job. Given the logic of our model, adjustment to a new 
employment equilibrium takes time, so that the full effects are visible only in the long run. 
Using the adjustment coefficient of the full BB model, the long run effect is 83 jobs in the 
steady state per one additional million euro of investment aid paid now. The estimate of the 
LSDVC model for this parameter is of a similar magnitude as the BB estimate, but the 
precision is much lower so that it fails to pass the ten per cent level of significance. The 
collapsed BB model could not isolate any remotely significant effect from investment aids. 
Generally, collapsing the instruments had no far-reaching effects on results.8
6 The test was carried out by using the xtunitroot command.
7 The median length of the lag can be obtained by solving for t in 5.0*  tO (Hamermesh 1993, 248), which 
is 5.0logO t .
8 We also estimated an alternative variant of the full BB model in which we relaxed the strict exogeneity 
conditions imposed so far. In particular, we allowed that contemporaneous direct payments, investment 
subsidies, and agri-environmental payments were determined endogenously. We used lags of order two back 
to the maximum possible as GMM-type instruments for these variables, leading to a total instrument count of 
304. The results supported the estimated adjustment coefficient of the full BB and LSDVC models presented 
here, but tended to give larger standard errors for the policy variables.
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Overall, the results on policy effects suggest that the CAP has very limited impact on job 
creation or maintenance in agriculture. Compared to Petrick and Zier (2011), the evidence 
presented here clearly suggests that the dynamic aspects of labour adjustment must not be 
ignored. Furthermore, the positive effects of agri-environmental programmes on labour use 
found by Pufahl and Weiss (2009) as well as Petrick and Zier (2011) were not supported by 
our findings. On the other hand, also the negative effects arising from direct payments, rural 
development measures as well as processing and marketing aids were not borne out here. In 
line with Petrick and Zier (2011), we found evidence in favour of the view that the 
introduction of the SFP in 2005 led to labour shedding. The decoupling dummy reported in 
Table 3 turned out to be significant in the LSDV, collapsed BB and LSDVC models. This is a 
plausible result if decoupling allowed the release of labour no longer necessary to maintain 
the production levels previously required to obtain crop- and livestock-related subsidies. 
According to the estimates from the LSDVC model, decoupling reduced average employment 
by 132 workers per county in the short run, or about seven per cent of the average agricultural 
labour force per county. The estimated long-run effect is 660 workers, or 35 per cent of the 
work force. Taken together, our more complete dynamic specification of CAP employment 
impacts supports the global picture of limited or even negative policy effects drawn by earlier 
analysis, while a couple of qualifications are made in the details.
A result that is supported with high precision and similar magnitude by two of the four 
estimators is the negative effect of the general wage level on labour use in agriculture. The 
short- and long-run wage elasticities at sample means implied by the two models are reported 
in Table 4.
Table 4: Short- and long-run labour demand elasticities with regard to the general 
wage level
LSDV LSDVC
Short-run elasticity -0.67 -0.53
Long-run elasticity -1.90 -2.67
Note: Elasticities computed at sample means. General wage level is annual average gross wage in all sectors 
per county.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The negative sign is consistent with the theory presented in section 0. The level of the 
estimates indicates that labour adjustment is inelastic in the short run but will be much more 
elastic in the longer run. Although not the main focus of this study, this result identifies the 
off-farm wage level as an important driver of labour use in agriculture. On the other hand, the 
regional population density does not have an impact on agricultural employment. Surprisingly,
practically none of the price indices turned out influential. The only exception is a weakly 
significant, positive effect of the price of investment goods on labour use in the collapsed BB 
model. A conclusion to be drawn from this outcome is that developments in exogenous prices 
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at the national or macro level are of relatively little relevance for regionally specific employ-
ment adjustments.9
So which factors drive regional employment in agriculture? Based on our East German 
sample, we can say that the influence of agricultural policy has been modest, whereas regional 
(but not national) developments on factor markets (labour) played an important role. In 
addition, the highly significant autoregressive parameter in all models indicates a strong path 
dependency in labour adjustments; after all last year’s labour stock is the best predictor of this 
year’s employment level. It seems likely that on-farm organisational as well as legal constraints
of labour restructuring limit the managers’ leeway to freely adjust employment levels according
to annual fluctuations in the farms’ external environment. Note that despite the relatively few 
significant regressors, the given specification can explain more than 70 per cent of employ-
ment variation in the data.10 Even so, it is clear that our approach cannot sort out all of the 
micro determinants of employment adjustment, such as managerial plans and abilities on the 
farms, differences in the farm labour force due to age and education, and the local availability 
of sufficiently qualified potential entrants. Future research using different types of data, 
including qualitative approaches, may shed further light on this issue.
6 Conclusions
In this article we presented results of four specifications of a dynamic employment equation 
with fixed effects, estimated on East German county level data. A consistent finding across 
the different estimators was that agricultural employment adjusts slowly to changes in 
the external environment. With an annual adjustment rate of about 20 to 25 per cent, it takes 
a bit more than three years to move halfway to the new steady state. While earlier studies
on employment in family farms found even slower adjustment, estimates compiled by 
Hamermesh (1993, 254) imply it is much faster in manufacturing. Typical median lags in 
manufacturing are about a half to one year. Labour adjustment appears to be slow in agri-
culture, but even slower in family farms than in farms based on wage labour, as in our case.
Direct payments, measures for the development of rural areas, transfers to LFA and agri-
environmental measures had no employment effect in any of the models. Two specifications 
suggest that job creation in the CAP framework was possible via capital subsidies. Such 
subsidies were mostly used to finance buildings or machinery. Apparently, increases in capital 
use were sufficiently complementary to labour that they slowed down labour cuts. According 
to our estimates, about 50 thousand euros of subsidies were required annually to create one 
additional job in the short run. However, capital subsidies are more effective in the long run, 
9 To capture the influence of other macro shocks not originating from price volatility, we replaced the price
indices by seven year dummies in an alternative specification. None of these dummies turned out significant, 
and the other parameter estimates remained practically unchanged.
10 This is shown by the “within” adjusted R² of the LSDV model in Table 3. It measures the share of the 
variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the right hand variables after group levels have been 
removed by time demeaning.
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as they also affect the steady state equilibrium labour demand. Our results also provide 
evidence that the introduction of decoupled direct payments in 2005 accelerated labour cuts. 
A plausible interpretation of this finding is that workers were no longer necessary to maintain 
production levels required for receiving payments. A further finding was that a rising general 
wage level in all sectors of the economy reduces labour use in agriculture. In the long run, a 
one per cent rise in the wage level leads to job losses in agriculture in the range of 1.9 to 2.7 
per cent.
In our view, the explicitly dynamic specification of the model is a step forward compared to 
earlier econometric evaluations of CAP effects on labour use. By using estimators representing
the current state of the methodological literature, we gave evidence that at least some of the 
CAP measures help to achieve the political goal of job maintenance in agriculture. However, 
overall, the CAP appears to be not a particularly effective tool for active job promotion in 
agriculture. Among the measures studied here, there is no single policy instrument which has 
unambiguously positive employment effects. Furthermore, adjustment takes time, so that 
short-term successes in job creation are unwarranted. Following the results, economic 
developments outside agriculture have, via the general wage level, the most pronounced effect 
on labour use in the farm sector.
The lion’s share of the CAP budget is still represented by the direct payments. Recent reform 
debates have shown that these payments are increasingly difficult to justify towards the 
public. Repeatedly, there have been proposals to cap them for larger farms, such as present in 
the region studied here. According to our analysis, moderate cuts in these unconditional 
payments would have no negative farm employment effects. If such effects are to be achieved 
by the CAP, focused instruments - such as investment aids - appear more promising.
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